An interview with Middle Easy specialist Amir Taheri ('Iranian reknown journalist') with the Jerusalem Post produced some very interesting analyses of what is going on in the Middle East. His rational is very pragmatic, and though it ommits the intricate forces of 'political correctness' and such, it explains some facets of the current balagan in a way that makes me doubt the usefullness of political correctness in situations that clearly maintain it mostly for PR.
The whole interviewis available at http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?apage=1&cid=1178096596427&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
Some particular questions and answers:
Hasn't Hizbullah emerged strengthened as a result of the war?
No, it has been destroyed. You know, Hizbullah was a major player in the Lebanese and Israel-Lebanon configurations in a certain context. That context has changed. As long as it controlled southern Lebanon, it could exert "proximity pressure" on Israel. That situation has changed; that status quo no longer exists. Now, whether Hizbullah is stronger or better armed today is a different question - one of speculation. Even if it has better arms, it doesn't have an area from which to launch new attacks without doing so from southern Beirut. But if it does that, the rest of the Lebanese population will say, "What is this business? You want to provoke us into a war from the middle of our city!"
That Hizbullah tried to camouflage its defeat by provoking a political crisis in Lebanon is also an indication of its understanding that the situation has changed and of its trying to find a new place in this new situation. It may become stronger in the future - I don't know; I'm not a prophet. But look, the Israelis killed 637 Hizbullah warriors out of a full-time fighting force of about 2,000. Usually in war, you talk of "decimation" - an army's losing one-tenth of its manpower. In this case, Hizbullah lost about a quarter of its fighters. It also lost literally all of its missile launching pads in the south, many missiles and arsenals. In other words, it lost manpower, territory and weaponry. What else do you want? But, you know [he laughs], Jews always want something more.
Could Hizbullah even exist without Iran?
Once it could have. But now, no. Finished. Nasrallah's big betrayal of Hizbullah was to transform it into an exclusively Iranian instrument of power, and become involved in a fight which doesn't have anything to do with it.
Anyway, while asking myself, "Why all this doom and gloom on the part of the Israelis?," I realized that a lot of it is imported from the West. Israel should guard against the danger of becoming too Westernized - too American - because the Americans are so powerful, nothing will happen to them, even if they are gloomy and doom-ridden. They can afford this luxury. You can't
Isn't the fact that we "have adopted more from the Western world" the reason we have a booming economy - as well as so many "gloomy" intellectuals? How would Israel look if it imitated its neighbors and not the United States?
Well, I don't want you to imitate your neighbors entirely, but rather to learn aspects from them. Israel, first and foremost, must be very Israeli, otherwise it's useless. It must be very Jewish, as well - otherwise, what's the point of it? So, the idea of having a cosmopolitan, Western, democratic, pluralist, hi-tech society, as such, is useless. I mean, you could have this anywhere in the world. The important thing is that the Israelis should not lose touch with their mythology, with their narrative. But, above all, they can't afford the luxury of self-loathing. You know, the Westerners can do that "we-are-guilty-everything-is-our-fault" routine. You are too small for this kind of luxury.
Should Israel, then, not have disengaged from Gaza?
No, I think you should not have disengaged from Gaza, unless in a broader context which becomes evident in the future. If you look at the history of the past 50 years or so, you see something very interesting. Israel has fought several wars with the Arabs and has won all of them. But these are the only wars in history where the winner was not allowed to impose the postwar status quo, because they all happened after the United Nations came into being. Every war in history has had a loser and a winner - which is the purpose of war. Otherwise it is useless. Its task is to change a situation through the use of force. If I have the force, I change the situation I don't like.
If I don't, I accept the situation. In the case of Israel's wars, the strange thing is that this principle didn't apply, because a third party intervened. You had others interfering in something that has nothing to do with them. They pass resolutions, and they say, "You should do this; you should do that."
Like this, there will never be peace. I mean, there is no example of this kind of peace-making. Once war is taken out of its natural role, people start speaking of a "just peace."
The concept of "just peace" is stupid, because peace cannot be "just" when somebody thinks it is unjust. Then they speak of "comprehensive peace."
Peace is peace. If you modify it with an adjective, it's like saying somebody is half pregnant or fully pregnant. You're either pregnant or you're not.
Then there's the "peace of the brave" - another ridiculous expression, because the brave don't make peace, they fight. Cowards make peace after they are defeated. The specificity of war is the clarity it creates. And you obfuscate that by adding all these modifiers. The only way that there can be peace in this region is to go back to the normal routes of war. So withdrawal from Gaza has no meaning unless Israel decides where it is and what it wants.
...Yet Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has placed focus on the Jews by denying the Holocaust and by threatening to wipe Israel off the map.
The reason for this is that there are two Irans, like Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. You have Iran as an expression of the Islamic Revolution, and you have Iran as a nation-state. As a nation-state, Iran has no basis for enmity with Israel. The two countries are not fighting over borders or access to markets or natural resources.
But Iran as an expression of the Islamic Revolution must hate Israel and vow to destroy it. This way, the regime can tell the Arabs, "Forget about the fact that we are Shi'ites; accept our leadership politically, and we will realize your dream of liberating Jerusalem and doing all the other nice things that you can't do yourself."
So, as an Islamic Republic, Iran is a mortal threat to Israel, but as a nation-state, it is a strong friend. There is no anti-Israeli sentiment or anti-Semitism in Iranian society. There's no Iranian writer or poet or filmmaker or playwright or artist who is an anti-Semite. It is something completely concocted by the regime.
Furthermore, you here may think that Iranians are knowledgeable about Israel. But they're not. Most Iranians don't even know where Israel is. Iran is a huge country with 70 million people, many of whom don't know where Pakistan is, or where Egypt is - let alone Israel. Nor do they care. Nor do the masses even know what the word "Holocaust" means.
Even if [the leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran and commander-in-chief of the Iranian Armed Forces Ayatollah Sayyid Ali] Khamenei says no? Isn't Khamenei the one calling the shots? [in relation to declaring war]
It doesn't work this way - with Ahmadinejad saying, "Let's go to war," and Khamenei saying, "No."
This is not only the wrong way to look at it, but it is imprudent. Prudence dictates taking Ahmadinejad seriously and assuming that he has the power - even if he doesn't. It's like when Hitler came to power, and the British and the French said, "But there's still [president Paul von] Hindenburg."
Systems like that don't work according to the law. The most recent example is the showdown over the captured British sailors. Ahmadinejad seized control of the issue and handled it how he wanted before the others could maneuver. The same goes for the nuclear issue. The natural tendency of Khamenei and the others was to fudge a bit, to call [EU Secretary-General] Javier Solana and say, "Let's have some kebab together," then give him a carpet as a present and say, "Let's negotiate in three months," and "Keep hope alive." This was the phrase. But then Ahmadinejad came along and said, "You know what? This train doesn't have a rear gear; it doesn't have a brake - it's going to go straight ahead."
Now, how could Khamenei come and say, "No, you're wrong. You're going to stop this train"?
In a revolutionary situation, the person who pushes for the most radical policies usually has the upper hand, because a revolution is like riding a bicycle. As long as you pedal, you keep going. If you stop pedaling, you collapse. Ahmadinejad understands this and is using it to his advantage.
The whole interviewis available at http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?apage=1&cid=1178096596427&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
Some particular questions and answers:
Hasn't Hizbullah emerged strengthened as a result of the war?
No, it has been destroyed. You know, Hizbullah was a major player in the Lebanese and Israel-Lebanon configurations in a certain context. That context has changed. As long as it controlled southern Lebanon, it could exert "proximity pressure" on Israel. That situation has changed; that status quo no longer exists. Now, whether Hizbullah is stronger or better armed today is a different question - one of speculation. Even if it has better arms, it doesn't have an area from which to launch new attacks without doing so from southern Beirut. But if it does that, the rest of the Lebanese population will say, "What is this business? You want to provoke us into a war from the middle of our city!"
That Hizbullah tried to camouflage its defeat by provoking a political crisis in Lebanon is also an indication of its understanding that the situation has changed and of its trying to find a new place in this new situation. It may become stronger in the future - I don't know; I'm not a prophet. But look, the Israelis killed 637 Hizbullah warriors out of a full-time fighting force of about 2,000. Usually in war, you talk of "decimation" - an army's losing one-tenth of its manpower. In this case, Hizbullah lost about a quarter of its fighters. It also lost literally all of its missile launching pads in the south, many missiles and arsenals. In other words, it lost manpower, territory and weaponry. What else do you want? But, you know [he laughs], Jews always want something more.
Could Hizbullah even exist without Iran?
Once it could have. But now, no. Finished. Nasrallah's big betrayal of Hizbullah was to transform it into an exclusively Iranian instrument of power, and become involved in a fight which doesn't have anything to do with it.
Anyway, while asking myself, "Why all this doom and gloom on the part of the Israelis?," I realized that a lot of it is imported from the West. Israel should guard against the danger of becoming too Westernized - too American - because the Americans are so powerful, nothing will happen to them, even if they are gloomy and doom-ridden. They can afford this luxury. You can't
Isn't the fact that we "have adopted more from the Western world" the reason we have a booming economy - as well as so many "gloomy" intellectuals? How would Israel look if it imitated its neighbors and not the United States?
Well, I don't want you to imitate your neighbors entirely, but rather to learn aspects from them. Israel, first and foremost, must be very Israeli, otherwise it's useless. It must be very Jewish, as well - otherwise, what's the point of it? So, the idea of having a cosmopolitan, Western, democratic, pluralist, hi-tech society, as such, is useless. I mean, you could have this anywhere in the world. The important thing is that the Israelis should not lose touch with their mythology, with their narrative. But, above all, they can't afford the luxury of self-loathing. You know, the Westerners can do that "we-are-guilty-everything-is-our-fault" routine. You are too small for this kind of luxury.
Should Israel, then, not have disengaged from Gaza?
No, I think you should not have disengaged from Gaza, unless in a broader context which becomes evident in the future. If you look at the history of the past 50 years or so, you see something very interesting. Israel has fought several wars with the Arabs and has won all of them. But these are the only wars in history where the winner was not allowed to impose the postwar status quo, because they all happened after the United Nations came into being. Every war in history has had a loser and a winner - which is the purpose of war. Otherwise it is useless. Its task is to change a situation through the use of force. If I have the force, I change the situation I don't like.
If I don't, I accept the situation. In the case of Israel's wars, the strange thing is that this principle didn't apply, because a third party intervened. You had others interfering in something that has nothing to do with them. They pass resolutions, and they say, "You should do this; you should do that."
Like this, there will never be peace. I mean, there is no example of this kind of peace-making. Once war is taken out of its natural role, people start speaking of a "just peace."
The concept of "just peace" is stupid, because peace cannot be "just" when somebody thinks it is unjust. Then they speak of "comprehensive peace."
Peace is peace. If you modify it with an adjective, it's like saying somebody is half pregnant or fully pregnant. You're either pregnant or you're not.
Then there's the "peace of the brave" - another ridiculous expression, because the brave don't make peace, they fight. Cowards make peace after they are defeated. The specificity of war is the clarity it creates. And you obfuscate that by adding all these modifiers. The only way that there can be peace in this region is to go back to the normal routes of war. So withdrawal from Gaza has no meaning unless Israel decides where it is and what it wants.
...Yet Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has placed focus on the Jews by denying the Holocaust and by threatening to wipe Israel off the map.
The reason for this is that there are two Irans, like Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. You have Iran as an expression of the Islamic Revolution, and you have Iran as a nation-state. As a nation-state, Iran has no basis for enmity with Israel. The two countries are not fighting over borders or access to markets or natural resources.
But Iran as an expression of the Islamic Revolution must hate Israel and vow to destroy it. This way, the regime can tell the Arabs, "Forget about the fact that we are Shi'ites; accept our leadership politically, and we will realize your dream of liberating Jerusalem and doing all the other nice things that you can't do yourself."
So, as an Islamic Republic, Iran is a mortal threat to Israel, but as a nation-state, it is a strong friend. There is no anti-Israeli sentiment or anti-Semitism in Iranian society. There's no Iranian writer or poet or filmmaker or playwright or artist who is an anti-Semite. It is something completely concocted by the regime.
Furthermore, you here may think that Iranians are knowledgeable about Israel. But they're not. Most Iranians don't even know where Israel is. Iran is a huge country with 70 million people, many of whom don't know where Pakistan is, or where Egypt is - let alone Israel. Nor do they care. Nor do the masses even know what the word "Holocaust" means.
Even if [the leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran and commander-in-chief of the Iranian Armed Forces Ayatollah Sayyid Ali] Khamenei says no? Isn't Khamenei the one calling the shots? [in relation to declaring war]
It doesn't work this way - with Ahmadinejad saying, "Let's go to war," and Khamenei saying, "No."
This is not only the wrong way to look at it, but it is imprudent. Prudence dictates taking Ahmadinejad seriously and assuming that he has the power - even if he doesn't. It's like when Hitler came to power, and the British and the French said, "But there's still [president Paul von] Hindenburg."
Systems like that don't work according to the law. The most recent example is the showdown over the captured British sailors. Ahmadinejad seized control of the issue and handled it how he wanted before the others could maneuver. The same goes for the nuclear issue. The natural tendency of Khamenei and the others was to fudge a bit, to call [EU Secretary-General] Javier Solana and say, "Let's have some kebab together," then give him a carpet as a present and say, "Let's negotiate in three months," and "Keep hope alive." This was the phrase. But then Ahmadinejad came along and said, "You know what? This train doesn't have a rear gear; it doesn't have a brake - it's going to go straight ahead."
Now, how could Khamenei come and say, "No, you're wrong. You're going to stop this train"?
In a revolutionary situation, the person who pushes for the most radical policies usually has the upper hand, because a revolution is like riding a bicycle. As long as you pedal, you keep going. If you stop pedaling, you collapse. Ahmadinejad understands this and is using it to his advantage.
